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A model of the opinion dynamics underlying the political decision is proposed. The analysis is
restricted to a bipolar scheme with a possible third political area. The interaction among voters is
local but the final decision strongly depends on global effects such as, for example, the rating of the
governments. As in the realistic case, the individual decision making process is determined by the
most relevant personal interests and problems. The phenomenological analysis of the national vote
in Italy and Germany has been carried out and a prediction of the next Italian vote as a function
of the government rating is presented.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of complex systems entered social science in
order to understand how self-organization, cooperative
effects and adaptation arise in social communities. In
this context the use of simple automata or dynamical
models often elucidates the underlying dynamics of the
observed behaviour (1-13).
In particular some models have been proposed to de-
scribe the opinion dynamics and the final decision of a
community of voters (3,5-13).
These models focus on the self-organization resulting
from a local dynamics, which represents the mutual in-
fluence, based on two simple properties:
i) individuals are more likely to interact with others
who already share many of their opinions;
ii) interaction increases the number of features that
individuals share.
However, a deeper analysis of the process which leads
to the final decision in a political vote requires an im-
provement of the proposed models.
This can be done in a mathematical way by considering
the application of the game theory to political problems
[14] or, more simply, by introducing in the decision pro-
cess other important global effects such as, for example,
the Government policy and/or the propaganda, which
are usually neglected.
In this paper we propose a model toward a more real-
istic description of the opinion dynamics underlying the
choice of the voters. The analysis is restricted to a bipo-
lar scheme with a possible third political area, but it
can be generalized to the case of many political parties.
This initial simplification helps to clarify the model and,
anyway, it applies to many European and non European
countries.
The model is based on the following points to be for-
malized and discussed in details later on:
1) There are initially three different groups of voters:
the right Coalition (RC), the left Coalition (LC) and a
central group (CG). The voters in the RC or LC do not
change their opinion: they represent the cores of the po-
litical bipolar scheme.
2) The individuals of the CG interact with each other
and with the individuals of the RC and of the LC. At
the end of the dynamical process there are three groups:
majority, minority and the others.
3) The final decision of the single CG voter is based on
his/her opinions on the arguments that he/she considers
more relevant.
4) The mutual local influence among voters is modified
by the global degree of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with
respect to the Government.
The scheme (1-4) is, of course, an extremely simplified
version of the real processes. For example the possibility
that each voter (LC, RC, CG) decides not to vote (ab-
stentionism) is not taken into account in the dynamics
and this implies that the abstentionism is proportionally
distributed among the different groups.
However the model has many steps of analysis,it re-
quires the application of general techniques of the com-
plex systems and, as we shall see, it is able to give some
interesting indications on the political dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows: the cognitive po-
litical model and the social-political interaction are de-
scribed in Sec. 1; in Sec. 2 we set the criterion of political
decision; in Sec. 3 the approximations introduced in the
numerical simulations are discussed; the phenomenolog-
ical analysis of the political vote in Italy and Germany
and the prediction for the next Italian vote are carried
out in Sec. 4; Sec. 5 is devoted to the conclusions and
outlooks.
21. THE COGNITIVE POLITICAL MODEL
Model general structure
In simulating the opinion dynamics toward a final po-
litical vote one has to generalize the available models of
social interaction.
In the Axelrod model [7, 8] of the cultural evolution
the interaction is limited to an imitation process in which
the agents adapt cultural traits stochastically from each
other with a bias toward similar agents. The interesting
final result of the evolution is the diversity: there are
different cultural domains.
In the bounded confidence model [9, 10, 12], more ori-
ented to the analysis of voting patterns, each voter pos-
sesses a single real valued opinion. When two voters in-
teract, they average their opinions only if the opinion
difference is within an external pre-fixed threshold oth-
erwise there is no interaction. Also in this case, as in
the previous models, the system breaks up into distinct
opinion clusters.
However, in the analysis of the political opinion dy-
namics there is, ab initio, a community with a non-
negligible heterogeneity and the selfish individual convic-
tions play a crucial role not only in the interaction among
individuals but also in the degree of influence of global
effects (governments, mass media,social shocks [15, 16])
on the single voter.
In particular,in a bipolar political system, the number
of votes of the two most important (left and right) coali-
tions depends upon an almost constant core of voters,
who do not change their opinion, and on the individu-
als with less strong political convictions (the CG) who
decide on the basis of a personal political analysis.
More precisely, in the political decision process each
individual is in front of many questions of social impor-
tance (the contexts) and he/she has to evaluate the pos-
sible alternative choices.
This analysis, based on a personal mental representa-
tion of the validity of the different alternatives, evolves
according to the interaction with the other members of
the community and according to the global influence.
As a result of this process, a restricted number of
more relevant concepts emerges: in the individual de-
cision making mechanism there is a simplification with
respect to the social-political complexity and a “dimen-
sional reduction” to the most relevant aspects.
The previous considerations can be formalized by fol-
lowing the interesting cognitive model proposed in ref.
[13] that, with some peculiar modifications (see later), is
a good starting point to investigate the opinion dynamics
toward a realistic simulation of the final political vote.
In ref. [13] one considers I agents who divide the world
into a number X of contexts in which they evaluate alter-
native possibilities (scenarios) according to their personal
opinions. The alternative scenarios are characterized by
their objective attributes a = {a1, . . . , aD}. A crucial
assumption of the model is that the Agent i’s theoreti-
cal payoff from the realization of a possible scenario a in
context x is posited to be a linear function
π
(x)
i (a) = ω
(x)
i · a (1)
where ω
(x)
i is the agent’s context vector, reflecting actual
circumstances of the context and the agent’s personal
opinions. For each agent there are X context vectors
each of dimension D, which are assumed fixed in the
model.
An agent does not know his/her context vectors explic-
itly as this would require a detailed understanding of the
effect of all attributes on his payoffs. However, by col-
lecting experience on choices he/she has made previously,
he/she learns to approximate the payoffs using an appro-
priate mental representation. The mental representation
is built around the world’s K “most important degrees
of freedom”, constituting the agent’s Concepts. One as-
sumes again that the approximate payoff that the agent
“computes” directly is linear
π˜
(x)
i (a) = ω˜
(x)
i · a (2)
with
ω˜
(x)
i =
K∑
µ=1
v
(x)
iµ γiµ (3)
the agent’s approximate context vector.
By eq.(3), ω˜
(x)
i is decomposed using mental weights
v
(x)
iµ in a reduced subspace of dimension K and a num-
ber K of concept vectors, {γiµ}
K
µ=1, assumed normalized
|γiµ| = 1, which the agent uses to evaluate alternatives.
Due to the reduction of dimensionality,K < D, the ap-
proximate payoff π˜
(x)
i deviates from the theoretical payoff
π
(x)
i . The agents’ goal is to find the best possible set of
Concepts and mental weights which minimizes the error
of the mental representation under the constraint that
only K Concepts can be used. The natural measure of
agent i’s representation error is the variance
Ei =
X∑
x=1
〈
(π
(x)
i − π˜
(x)
i )
2
〉
x
(4)
where 〈.〉x is the average over alternatives in context x,
that can be written as
Ei =
X∑
x=1
|ω
(x)
i |
2 − Ui (5)
where the agent’s utility Ui is given by
3Ui =
K∑
µ=1
γiµ ·W i · γ
µ
i (6)
and Wi is a positive semi-definite, D × D dimensional
matrix, called the world matrix,
W i =
X∑
x=1
ω
(x)
i ◦ ω
(x)
i , (7)
which encompasses all information about agent i’s rela-
tionship to the world.
The criterion for the political decision, that will be
discussed in sec. 2, is based on the minimization of Ei
which is equivalent to maximize Ui. This is the well-
known Principal Component Analysis (PCA) prob-
lem. According to this, the optimal concept vectors are
provided by the K most significant (largest eigenvalues)
eigenvectors of W i in the considered basis of the D di-
mensional space (see below). Thus to achieve the best
possible mental representation the agent should choose
his/her concept vectors according to the eigenvectors of
his/her world matrix in the order of their significance.
Two important remarks are now in order:
a) In the application of the model to the political
dynamics the previous considerations apply only to the
agents in the CG (see the next subsections). The agents
in the RC and LC are assumed to have fixed orthogonal
concept vectors ,called rµ and lµ respectively, with scalar
products rµrν = δµν , lµlν = δµν , rµlµ = 0. These vectors
form the basis of two fixed orthogonal subspaces.
The orthogonality of the subspaces associated with the
LC and the RC is also an approximation because in the
real dynamics the concept vectors of the LC and RC are
not always completely orthogonal (bipartisan choices).
With this approximation one assumes that the bipartisan
choices are irrelevant for the final political decision.
b) The identification, sorting and truncation of the de-
grees of freedom in the model is closely analogous to what
occurs inWhite’s Density Matrix Renormalization Group
method (DMRG)[17, 18]). In the DMRG the optimally
renormalized degrees of freedom turn out to be the K
most significant eigenvectors of the reduced density ma-
trix of the quantum subsystem embedded in the environ-
ment with which it interacts.
The socio-political interaction
As discussed in the introduction, the opinion dynamics
is due to local interactions among voters and to global
political effects. The local and global interactions,
related with the previous cognitive model, will be now
separately analyzed.
a) The local interaction
The representation error is minimal if the agent
learns to approximate his/her world matrix in the K
dimensional subspace spanned by the most significant
eigenvectors of his/her world matrix. The final vote
decision is due to the social-political network and, in our
bipolar scheme,it is useful to cast context vectors into
two basic categories [13]:
1) context vectors which only depend on a single
agent, with a world matrix W 0i
2) context vectors for agent i which depend on the
interaction with at least one other agent j.
For simplicity only pair interactions will be consid-
ered and following ref. [13] the world matrix to be used
in the utility function is written as
W i =W
0
i +
∑
j∈CG
cij Sj +
∑
j∈LC
lij Sj +
∑
j∈RC
rij Sj , (8)
where the total agents number is N , the agent i is in the
CG (see later), the parameters cij , lij , rij measure the
relative strength of socio-political interactions with agent
j in the different groups (CG, LC, RC) and Sj is given
by
Sj =
K∑
µ=1
γjµ ◦ γ
µ
j , (9)
i.e. by Sj there is in Wi an overlap of the concept vectors
of the agents i and j.
It is important to stress that the previous interactions
are among the agents i of the CG with the other agents in
the same group, in the LC and in the RC. Indeed, in our
scheme the agents in the LC or RC do not change their
opinion and their world matrices are fixed to constant
W 0i . Moreover the world matrix of the agents in the LC
is orthogonal to the world matrix for the RC agents.
b) The global effects
The opinion making process in a national political vote
depends only partially on the local interaction and is
strongly influenced by other important elements such as
the decisions of the Government and the mass media role.
In order to include these effects in the dynamical process,
let us introduce a set of indices, δi, to describe the satis-
faction of the agent i with respect to the global political
decisions. Again the voters in the RC and LC do not
change opinion despite their satisfaction/dissatisfaction
and then the satisfaction indices, 0 < δi < 1, related
with the rating of the global events, are relevant only for
the voters in the CG.
4In the previous subsection, the local influence has been
introduced by the political interaction matrices ci,j , li,j ,
ri,j . In the political bipolar scheme, a simple way to
include the satisfaction indices, δi, in the dynamics is to
consider that a voter who has a positive perception of the
Government actions increases the strength of its interac-
tion with the coalition which governs while a dissatisfied
voter tends to interact more with the opposition. There-
fore the interaction matrices of an agent i of the CG with
the agents j of the LC or of the RC will depend on the
satisfaction index in such a way to increase the interac-
tion with the majority and decrease the interaction with
the minority or viceversa. The interaction among voters
in the CG remains unchanged.
In section 3 the li,j , ri,j dependence on δi will be clar-
ified.
2. THE DECISION PROCESS
The most important elements which determine the
agent representation of the social-political system have
been specified in the previous sections. Following ref.
[13], one can assume that the system evolves according
to a “gradient adjustment dynamics” obtained by the
time evolution of the concept vectors given by
δγiµ
δt
∝
∂Ui
∂γiµ
. (10)
Of course, only the CG agents have a dynamical evolu-
tion because the agents in the LC and in the RC have
fixed world matrices , W i = W
0
i , and the correspond-
ing concept vectors span orthogonal subspaces. For the
agents in the CG it is reasonable to assume that with-
out interaction they choose random concept subspaces,
i.e. complete disorder, and this implies that their matri-
cesW 0i have a Wishart distribution (see [19, 20]). After
the evolution according to the best response dynamics, at
the equilibrium [13], each agent of the CG decides his/her
vote and one needs a well defined criterion to understand
if his/her final “position” is closer to the LC or the RC
or is too far from both. The most simple idea is a com-
parison of the final concept vectors of each agent in the
CG with the concept vectors of the LC and of the RC
and then to define a “political distance” by the scalar
products of the previous concept vectors. However, as
clarified in ref.[13], the choice of the concept vectors is
not unique and only the subspace they span is relevant
for the dynamical process. Then the criterion has to
be related with the subspace spanned by CG agent con-
cept vectors at the equilibrium with respect to the LC
subspace (i.e. spanned by the concept vectors of the LC
agent) or to the RC subspace and it is natural to consider
the “angle”, θ, between two subspaces as the agent-agent
distance [21].
The procedure is the following one. Firstly one con-
siders the, K, γi concept vectors of agent i as columns of
a new matrix Ωi (D x K dimensional matrix). Similarly
we construct the matrix Ωj of any agent of LC and of the
RC (fixed by definition). According to refs. [22, 23], we
calculate the overlap between Ωi and Ωj in the following
way:
Ω
′
i = Ωi − Ωj(Ω
T
j Ωi) (11)
Hence, we calculate the angle θ (in [0, π/2]) as
θi,L = arcsin(min[1, ‖Ω
′
i‖∞]) (12)
and
θi,R = arcsin(min[0, ‖Ω
′
i‖∞]) (13)
where ‖Ω
′
i‖∞ is the biggest singular value of Ω
′
i according
to the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). With this
definition the distance is between 0 (politically equiva-
lent) and π/2 (politically orthogonal). Finally the agent
i will vote for the RC or the LC, according to the fact
that the smallest “angle” is θi,R or θi,L, respectively.
However, in order to have a more realistic model of the
decision process, one has to take into account another im-
portant political aspect: the bipolar systems are, indeed,
not perfectly bipolar. There is a non negligible part of
the individuals in the CG that at the end of the dynam-
ical evolution is still “too far” from the political ideas of
the L and the R coalition and decide to vote for other
possible groups (OG).
Of course one can neglect this point, which, however,
is a crucial ingredient of the political dynamics.
Our definition of “political distance” between two
agents is related to the angle 0 < θ < π/2 of the cor-
responding subspaces spanned by the concept vectors.
When θ = π/2 two subspaces are orthogonal and then
an agent i of the CG will be considered voting for the
OG if both the angles θi,R and θi,L are in the range be-
tween a fixed value ǫ and π/2. An increase of ǫ decreases
the number of agents in the CG who vote for the third
group: ǫ represents the “mobility” of the CG toward the
political coalitions.
3. THE APPROXIMATIONS
The equilibrium and dynamic properties depend on the
interaction matrices cij , lij , rij . As a first approximation,
one considers for the local interaction a mean-field po-
litical network with cij = lij = rij = h. This implies
that, without global effects, the final voting choice is di-
rectly correlated with the number of agents of the LC
and of the RC: a larger number of agents in the LC (RC)
5will automatically determine that a larger number of CG
agents will we “closer” to the LC (RC).
Moreover, the global effects change the interaction
strength of the agent i in the CG with the voters of the
L and R coalitions, by the satisfaction index δi (the in-
teraction within the CG is unmodified).
For simplicity, let us assume that δi = δ is independent
on the agent i. By definition, it has opposite effect on the
interactions with the LC and the RC. Then the starting
approximation for the world matrix Wi of the agent i in
the CG, which includes the local and the global interac-
tions, can be written as
W i =W
0
i+
∑
j∈CGi
hSj+
∑
j∈LCi
h(1+δ)Sj+
∑
j∈RCi
h(1−δ)Sj ,
(14)
Where δ has been conventionally assumed positive if
the interaction with the LC increases. The parameter δ
drives the opinion dynamics and determines the majority.
A more detailed analysis of its meaning and effects is
carried out in section 4.
Another assumption concerns the initial core distribu-
tions of the L and the R coalitions. In fact, it is not diffi-
cult to take into account a numerical difference between
the core voters of the two coalitions, but this would intro-
duce another parameter in the model and, in the present
work, we are mainly interested in analyzing the global
effects on the vote decision. Therefore, in this first ver-
sion of the model, we shall consider a symmetrical initial
distribution for the core voters of the L and R coalitions.
Moreover, abstentionism is not of dynamical origin and
then, in the numerical simulation, is proportionally di-
vided according to the group initial distributions.
The initial core voters of the L and R coalitions in our
simulations are assumed equal to the 41% of valid votes
while the CG has only the 18%.
These numbers are not far from the real political sit-
uation: we verified that the lowest level for the L and
R coalitions (assumed as the cores) in Italian national
votes, from 1996 to 2004, is close to the 41% of the valid
votes.
This implies that the winning coalition is determined
by the decision of a relatively small number of individuals
of the CG.
4. VOTE ANALYSIS
Before analyzing the data of the national vote in Italy
and in Germany, let us note that in the model there are
essentially two parameters, δ and ǫ, because, in the data
fitting, a change in the parameter h gives a rescaling of
the previous ones.
For the simulations of the dynamical evolution one con-
siders the initial configuration previously discussed, with
D=10, K=4 and 10.000 agents. The results are averaged
on 200 samples.
Italian elections
Table I reports the results of the Italian national vote
from 1994 to 2004 for the different groups, the difference
(in percent), ∆LR, in the final vote between the L and
R coalitions and the fitted values of δ and ǫ which re-
produce the data (starting with the initial configurations
previously discussed).
Table I: The results of the Italian national vote from 1994
to 2004 for the three different groups (RC, LC, OG) and the
difference (∆LR) (in percent). We also report the respective
values of δ and ǫ which allow us to reproduce the data. The L
coalition includes the following parties: Democratici di Sinis-
tra, Margherita, Rifondazione Comunista, Verdi, Udeur, SDI,
Italia dei valori, Comunisti Italiani. The R coalition contains
Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord, UDC, PRI. The
other parties are in the third group.
Year RC LC OG ∆LR δ ǫ
1994 50.4% 45.3 % 4.3 % -5.1 % -0.555 1.465
1996 42.2% 43.3 % 14.5 % 1.1 % 0.134 1.356
1999 43.8% 42.2 % 14.0 % -1.6% -0.195 1.361
2001 49.5% 46.3 % 4.2 % -3.2 % -0.345 1.468
2004 46.6% 45.5 % 7.9 % -1.1 % -0.121 1.425
The fit shows that when ǫ increases, the voters of the
OG decrease and the final vote is politically more polar-
ized: the difference between the two leading coalitions
increases.
Moreover, when the (dis)satisfaction index δ is small
also ǫ is small, i.e. the agents of the CG prefer to vote for
a third group. In other words, when the consequences of
the government choices are considered “neutral” by the
CG agents, the latter tend not to vote for a more political
coalition.
On the other hand, when the (dis)satisfaction in-
creases, they feel that a stronger political option is more
useful and vote for the L or the R coalition. There is any-
way a “physiological” threshold of about 4 % of voters
who choose the OG.
The picture becomes more clear if one looks carefully
the table and considers the evolution of the different Ital-
ian governments from 1994 to 2004.
In 1994 the RC won the election with a strong dissatis-
faction toward the previous government (δ = −0.55 and
ǫ = 1.465).
In 1996, due to the internal problem of the majority, a
party left the RC and created an independent pole. This
increased the OG and gave the final victory to the LC
(by a moderate dissatisfaction δ = 0.134 and ǫ = 1.36).
6In 1999, the first negative signals for the LC govern-
ment appeared as a small dissatisfaction (δ = −0.195)
and a larger vote to the OG (ǫ = 1.36) in the results of
the election for the European Parliament.
In 2001 the national vote was polarized against the LC
government (δ = −0.345 and ǫ = 1.47) and the RC won
the election.
The European vote in 2004 is, in turn, a negative indi-
cation for the RC government because there is a strong
reduction of δ (δ = −0.12 with respect to the previous
value δ = −0.345) and a clear signal of an emerging larger
third group with respect to the previous election in 2001.
Hence the general behaviour of the agents in the CG
seems to develop according the following steps: i) an ini-
tial political choice; ii) a dissatisfaction that leads to vote
for the OG in the mean term elections; iii)a polarization
against the Government in the following political elec-
tion.
The previous considerations are probably obvious for
an “educated” political observer and yet it is quite in-
teresting that they are reproduced by a mathematical
model. Moreover one can play a risky game: a predic-
tion for the next Italian vote in April 2005 (see later).
German elections
Let us now consider the national vote in Germany from
1987 to 2002.
Since we also want to have indications about the dif-
ferent political behaviour of the Italian and German vot-
ers, we shall start with the previous initial distribution
among the RC, the LC and the CG which, anyway, is not
far from the minimum results obtained by the R and L
coalitions (41.3% and 39.7%).
Table II, as table I before, reports the results of the
German national vote for the different groups and the
fitted values of δ and ǫ.
Table II: As in tab. I the results of the German national vote
from 1987 to 2002 for the three different groups (RC, LC,
OG) and the difference (∆LR) (in percent). We also report
the respective values of δ and ǫ which allow us to reproduce
the data. The L coalition is given by SPD, Green party, PDS
and the R coalition includes CDU, CSU and FDP. The other
parties are in the third group.
Year RC LC OG ∆LR δ ǫ
1987 53.4% 45.3 % 1.3 % -8.1 % -0.944 1.513
1990 54.8% 39.7 % 5.5 % -15.1 % -2.215 1.410
1994 48.3% 48.1 % 3.6 % -0.2% -0.013 1.477
1998 41.3% 52.7 % 6.0 % 11.4 % 1.440 1.430
2002 48.5% 47.7 % 3.8 % -0.8 % -0.080 1.475
There is a clear relation between ǫ and δ which shows
that German voters have different attitude with respect
to the Italian ones. Indeed, in this case, when δ increases
ǫ decreases, i.e. the third group is larger. In other words,
a bad government rating leads to vote for other groups
rather than for the political coalitions. This is probably
due to the fact that in Germany the other groups are
essentially politically oriented while in Italy they tend to
be more independent ones.
A deeper analysis requires, again, an understanding of
the dynamics of abstentionism.
The meaning of the variation of δ
The (dis)satisfaction index δ describes the rating of the
government decisions as perceived by the agents and the
parameter ǫ is a measure of the mobility of the CG.
With a positive/negative δ the majority will be of
the LC/RC coalition. However to have the majority of
votes does not automatically mean that the correspond-
ing coalition wins the election: a coalition which obtained
a 60% majority in the last national vote and obtains only
the 55% in the next one has still the majority (and then
δ has the same sign) but with less consensus and, in this
sense, does not win the election.
Therefore δ is effectively the index of the strength of
the interaction of the CG with the L an R coalitions
which determines the majority. Its variation from an
election to the next one, ∆δ, is a more reliable “measure”
of the evolution of the rating of the government and of
the success of the coalitions.
The values of ∆δ are obtained by table I: ∆δ(99−96) =
−0.33, ∆δ(01 − 99) = −0.15, ∆δ(04 − 01) = 0.22 (the
elections before these dates are not considered because
the victory of the LC in 1996 was due to a breaking of
the RC and the government before the 94 election was
a technical government rather than a political one) and
they are correlated with the corresponding variations of
ǫ, ∆ǫ, as shown in fig. 1.
The meaning of this correlation between ∆δ and ∆ǫ
has been previously discussed and for the German vote
one has a different behaviour with respect to the Italian
case.
A prediction: the next vote in Italy
It is useful to show how the model can make some
predictions and, as an example, let us consider the next
Italian vote in April 2005.
For the prediction one needs to know the correlation
between ∆δ and ∆ǫ. In fig. 1 there are very few points
and a reliable result requires a precise determination of
the correlation. However, since it is useful, in our opinion,
to show the procedure, let us consider in the numerical
simulation the correlation obtained by fig. 1.
7Figure 1: Correlation between ∆δ and ∆ǫ for the Italian case.
Unfortunately, the next Italian vote is not a national
homogeneous ones but, rather, it is a regional election
extended to the large part of the country (see later).
If one considers this election more politically homoge-
neous to the vote for the European Parliament, i.e. the
crucial elements of the political debate are similar to the
previous 2004 vote, therefore the starting point for the
simulation is the election in 2004 and the results of the
model as a function of ∆δ(05 − 04) is reported in tab.
III. As in the previous analyses, abstentionism is fixed
to 17%.
Table III: The prediction of the model for the next Italian
vote, when the 2004 election has been considered as the start-
ing point.
∆δ ∆ǫ RC LC OG
0 0 46.6 % 45.4 % 8.0 %
0.05 -0.038 44.6 % 43.8 % 11.6 %
0.10 -0.065 43.1 % 42.8 % 14.1 %
0.15 -0.075 42.4 % 42.6 % 15.0 %
0.20 -0.061 42.8 % 43.5 % 13.7 %
0.25 -0.016 44.7 % 45.8 % 9.5 %
0.30 0.066 47.2 % 48.8 % 4.0 %
0.35 0.192 47.0 % 49.0 % 4.0 %
0.40 0.367 46.7 % 49.3 % 4.0 %
0.45 0.598 46.5 % 49.5 % 4.0%
0.50 0.891 46.3 % 49.7 % 4.0 %
On the other hand, if the next Italian vote is consid-
ered politically more similar to a national government
election, the starting point of the analysis is the polit-
ical result in 2001 and the prediction as a function of
∆δ(05− 01) are given in tab. IV.
As one can see, worsening government rating, which
implies a positive ∆δ, can cause today majority to loose
the election and become minority. However, this depends
on the numerical value of ∆δ and the question arises if
Table IV: The prediction of the model for the next Italian
vote, when the 2001 election has been considered as the start-
ing point.
∆δ ∆ǫ RC LC OG
0 0 49.7 % 46.3 % 4.0 %
0.05 -0.038 47.7 % 44.8 % 7.5 %
0.10 -0.065 46.2 % 43.7 % 10.1 %
0.15 -0.075 45.5 % 43.5 % 11.0 %
0.20 -0.061 45.9 % 44.4 % 9.7 %
0.25 -0.016 47.7 % 46.7 % 5.6 %
0.30 0.066 48.3 % 47.7 % 4.0 %
0.35 0.192 48.0 % 48.0 % 4.0 %
0.40 0.367 47.8 % 48.2 % 4.0 %
0.45 0.598 47.6 % 48.4 % 4.0%
0.50 0.891 47.3 % 48.7 % 4.0 %
it is somehow related to the evolution of the opinions on
the Government decisions as “detected”, for example, by
polls.
The answer to this risky question requires a careful
comparison with the rating of the governments obtained
by polls immediately before the various elections [24].
This point is interesting also for practical reasons (see
sec. 5) and will be discussed in a forthcoming paper [25].
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOKS
The proposed model is a first step towards a more real-
istic description of the opinion dynamics of the political
vote and, indeed, it has many key elements of the decision
process. However there are some approximations:
1) Abstentionism has not a dynamical origin.
This is an important point because the cores of the
different coalitions do not change opinion, regardless of
the value of the satisfaction index.
However, in the real political arena the winning coali-
tion is determined not only by the vote decision of the
agents in the CG but also by the decision not to vote of
the agents in the core coalition: an agent with clear po-
litical convictions but strongly dissatisfied from his/her
government does not vote for the opposite coalition but
prefers the abstentionism. Since the winning coalition
has only a few percent of vote more than the minority,
this effect can easily determine the final result.
2) For the same reason,the symmetric distribution of
the core of the L and R coalitions is an approximation:
a small initially asymmetry of the coalitions can change
the final result and/or increase the strength of the global
parameter δ needed for the victory.
3) The symmetric mean field local interaction of the
agents in the CG with the LC and RC individuals.
8Indeed, the opinion dynamics starts soon after a polit-
ical vote and completes the evolution with the next vote
choice. The agents in the CG who voted for the win-
ning coalition are, at least immediately after the vote,
predominately interested to interact with the majority.
From this point of view, the symmetric local interaction
means that the model applies for timeframe close to the
next vote or, generally, when the agents of the CG be-
come more independent respect to the previous majority.
The points 1-3 require the introduction of (at least) other
three parameters in the model.
Despite the previous approximations, that can be over-
come by a more complete version, the model is able to:
a) describe the simplification procedure of the social-
political context;
b) introduce local and global interaction in the dynam-
ics;
c) define a reliable “political distance” among the in-
dividuals;
d) introduce the alternative third choice for the voters;
e) determine phenomelogical relations among the pa-
rameters and some quantities obtained by data;
f) make some predictions;
g) potentially combine simulations and polls.
This last point is interesting because during the po-
litical polls, people are more incline to answer on more
general and less direct political questions. For example,
the answer is less uncertain if the question is about the
coalition rather than the single political party. Now, it is
not difficult to think of a set of undirect questions able
to determine the parameters of the model ( δ, ǫ plus the
others needed for points 1-3) and put on a more rigorous
basis the relation among polls and mathematical models.
Finally, the next steps include: a) a more realistic version
of the model [25]; b) a combined effort with poll experts;
c) the application of the model to different countries. In-
deed, the correlation, if any, between δ and ǫ certainly
depends on the peculiar characteristics of the considered
nation but it should be important to verify if there are
similar political behaviors in different places.
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